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During the Civil War, the Communist Party and its activists had to constantly 
adapt to ever-changing situations. This paper aims to study their reaction in 
Ukraine in 1919 after Denikin took control of the country. It will focus on 
the 800 activists sent behind enemy lines from July to November 1919. Using 
the paperwork of special bodies created by the Central Committee (CC) of 
the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine (CP(b)U) to tackle this task 
(Zafrontbyuro  –   rearguard bureau; Voenotdel  –   military department; Otdel 
Svjazi  –   communications department), the article will first question the way 
underground activists were selected. Second, it will highlight how missions 
behind enemy lines were designed and organized. Third, it will consider 
the missions themselves and the hardships endured once activists reached 
Denikin-controlled territory. Fourth, one has to wonder what activists tried to 
do, questioning what they thought about their dangerous job and what their 
missions effectively brought to the Bolsheviks. This will help us understand how 
the Civil War was indeed a “formative experience” (in Sheila Fitzpatrick’s words) 
for the communists, shaping their worldview and behavior.
Keywords: Civil War, Ukraine, 1919, General Denikin, Communist Party, White 
Terror, repression, Bolshevik underground
Во время Гражданской войны Коммунистической партии и ее активистам 
приходилось постоянно приспосабливаться к быстро меняющимся обсто-
ятельствам. Целью настоящей статьи является изучение их реакции на за-
хват власти Деникиным на Украине в 1919 г. Речь идет о 800 активистах, 
которые были отправлены в тыл врага с июля по ноябрь 1919 г. На основе 
архивных материалов специальных органов (Зафронтбюро, Военотдела, 
Отдела связи), созданных при ЦК КП(б) Украины, изучается вопрос о том, 
как отбирались кандидаты в подпольщики и каким образом организовы-
вались миссии в стане врага. Статья описывает сами миссии, трудности 
и риски, с которыми сталкивались активисты, оказавшись на контролиру-
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емой Деникиным территории, их мнения о своей задаче, а также то, какую 
пользу из их действий извлекали большевики. Все вышеизложенное позво-
ляет понять, что делало Гражданскую войну подлинным «формирующим 
опытом» (по словам Шейлы Фицпатрик) для коммунистов, определяющим 
их мировоззрение и поведение.
Ключевые слова: Гражданская война, Украина, 1919, Деникин, Коммунисти-
ческая партия, белый террор, репрессии, большевистское подполье
The deeds of the communists were beyond history according to Stalin, 
who stated “that the Bolsheviks remind us of the hero of Greek mythology, 
Antæus” [History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), 
p. 362–363]. From an opposite point of view, Adam B.  Ulam agreed that 
“the story of the Bolsheviks… is one of drama and success unparalleled in 
modern history”, although it bore “the seeds of future totalitarianism” [Ulam, 
p. VII]. A view from the periphery confirms that Bolshevism’s rise to power 
meant the end of freedom for the people. As Ivan Maistrenko puts it, “the his-
tory of the Communist Party of Ukraine is also the history of Ukraine after it 
was conquered by Soviet Russia” [Майстренко, с. 5]. Since “success” turned 
into failure in 1991, Russian and Ukrainian archive-based studies alike have 
focused on the way Bolsheviks constituted a new elite taking control over the 
country [Фролов], the nomenklatura [Дорошко], which had common traits 
with the medieval “brotherhood of the sword” [Павлюченков].
Still, few scholars have tackled a key issue: how a militant group that 
had been a part of the “liberation movement” against tsarist autocracy and 
relied on radicalized workers became a ruling bureaucracy. Alexander Rab-
inowitch has traced this process in Petrograd from early 1917 to late 1918 
[Rabinowitch, 1968; Rabinowitch, 1976; Rabinowitch, 2007]. At this time, 
the Civil War had begun but the worst was yet to come, as its flames burnt 
across all the former empire for two more years. This period was a source of 
multiple experiences for activists. An early Bolshevik did not live through 
these events in the same way as someone who had joined the Party after 
October, just as a militant from Petrograd or Moscow, the heart of Soviet 
Russia, was surely in a different position from a communist in Ukraine, 
where “Soviet power” was not firmly established until 1920. People and 
party structures had to constantly adapt to ever-changing situations, mak-
ing their ideas and practices evolve rapidly several times.
We can observe this phenomenon in Ukraine in 1919. Ukrainian Bol-
sheviks were so self-confident when they seized power over eastern Ukraine 
in late 1918 –  early 1919 that they implemented very radical policies, par-
ticularly in the countryside. After a few months of Red rule, they suddenly 
realized that they were short of support, especially among the peasantry. 
Thanks to this, the White Voluntary Army of General Denikin took over 
eastern Ukraine in the late spring of 1919 and started moving north to-
ward Moscow. This was the beginning of the most difficult period for So-
viet power during the Civil War, when the Sovdepiya, under the threat of 
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several enemies, was nearly reduced to the territory of ancient Muscovy. 
The occupation of Ukraine by the White Army was also a deep shock for 
the Ukrainian Bolsheviks, who fell from the heights of power to the status 
of persecuted outlaws.
This paper aims to study the reaction in Ukraine of the apparatus of the 
Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine (CP(b)U) and its activists to this 
distressing situation. Three special bodies designed to tackle were created by 
the Central Committee (CC) of the CP(b)U: the Zafrontbyuro (literally “be-
yond-the-front-line bureau” or “rearguard bureau” in Yaroslav Bilinsly’s words 
[Hunczak, p. 121]), the Voenotdel (military department) and the Otdel Svjazi 
(communications department) organized a web of underground militants 
acting under Denikin. Among the paperwork these departments produced 
[ЦДАГОУ. Ф. 1. Оп. 18], one can find some impressive tables regarding 800 
activists sent behind enemy lines from July to November 1919. The reports 
kept about their activity tell a slightly different story: every mission could fail, 
as an activist could fall ill with typhus or be arrested and shot on the spot. In 
the 1920s and early 1930s, when the new elite could still publicly remember 
its glorious past, some of this material was published in the Ukrainian Istpart 1 
journal, Letopis Revolyutsii. After this, one had to wait until the mid-1960s 
to read the first scholarly study on the topic. Written in the Soviet style, it 
had to prove that the Zafrontbyuro “followed Lenin’s advice” and “created the 
necessary conditions for the activity of underground activists and partisan 
units.” Nonetheless, it is a rather reliable factual account, as it tells us much 
about the roles of Vladimir Zatonsky and Stanislav Kossior, who were re-
habilitated in the late 1950s after having been eliminated as “enemies of the 
1 Istpart: Commission for the History of the October Revolution and of the Communist 
Party.
1. Report about the organisation of partisan units by Korobkin in the Donbass uyezds  
of Starobel’sk and Lisichansk in August 1919 // TsDAGOU. Stock 1. List 18. Dos. 33. F. 10
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people” in 1936–1938 
[Случевская, с. 5, 305].
The emphasis of 
this paper will focus on 
activists’ experiences. 
Thanks to both pub-
lished and previously 
unreleased material, it 
will first question the 
way underground ac-
tivists were selected. 
Second, it will highlight 
how missions behind 
enemy lines were de-
signed and organized. 
Third, it will consider 
the missions them-
selves and the hard-
ships endured once 
activists reached Denikin-controlled territory. Fourth, one has to wonder 
what activists tried to do, questioning what they thought about their dan-
gerous job and what their missions effectively brought to the Bolsheviks. 
This will help us understand how the Civil War was indeed a “formative ex-
perience” (in Sheila Fitzpatrick’s words) for the communists, shaping their 
worldview and behavior.
The Selection of Underground Activists
The defeat of the Reds in the spring and summer of 1919 was two-
fold. Eastern Ukraine was under threat from Denikin from April, when 
the Voluntary Army started to conquer the Donbass, until late June, as 
White troops took over Khar’kov (Kharkiv) and Yekaterinoslav (Dnipro). 
In Central Ukraine, the Bolsheviks were forced out of Kiev (Kyiv) 2 in the 
closing days of August: Petlyuras’s soldiers, coming from the west, entered 
the city the same day as Denikin’s, coming from the east. When reading 
Soviet historiography, one might think that the Reds retreated in an orderly 
fashion while preparing a counteroffensive. Members of the Communist 
Party were mobilized by decree into the Red Army or local armed units 
as soon as the White troops approached the Donbass and then the Kiev 
region [Случевская, с. 14–17, 32–34]. Other sources show a rather differ-
ent picture, one of panic and escape: “The people rushing north cannot be 
described as a united, structured or organized whole. It was a ramshackle 
collection of people. Some communists’ fathers and mothers… some com-
2 The contemporary Ukrainian names are mentioned in brackets when employed for the 
first time. Otherwise, the 1919 Russian form is used in this paper (as it is done in primary 
sources).
2. Mandate of comrade Sashko sent by the CC of the CP(b)U 
to the Odessa underground Party Committee // TsDAGOU. 
Stock 1. List 18. Dos. 5. F. 49A
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munards… various adventurers were also fleeing. In a word, all sorts of 
people were fleeing to the north, in those stifling days of the terrible year 
nineteen” [Xвильовий, с. 398].
In such an atmosphere, only two local Bolshevik organizations in the 
whole of Ukraine were able to set up in advance a web of underground activ-
ists who would stay when the area was occupied by the enemy: in Kremen-
chug (Kremenchuk) and Odessa (Odesa), which were conquered by the 
Whites in August [КП(б)У за Денікінщини, 1929, № 5–6, с. 290; 1930, № 1, 
с. 226–233]. Earlier, such local initiatives were impossible. This highlighted 
the need for central bodies created by the CC that could coordinate under-
ground activity. The Zafrontbyuro was established on 30 June, a few days ear-
lier than the other departments. They had to call for volunteers, who were 
more or less recommended by local party committees or high party officials. 
As a consequence, “not all of the enrolled staff members fit their task and a lot 
of them are completely casual towards the revolution” [ЦДАГОУ. Ф. 1. Оп. 
18. Д. 40, Л. 11, 33–37 (lists of volunteers)].
Besides the lack of preparation, random recruitment also resulted 
from a situation which was awkward in itself. As an activist sent to Ne-
zhin (Nizhyn) summed it up: “Those who were left by the [local] party 
committee to go underground could not show up as everybody knew them 
as communists”. In contrast, an undercover Bolshevik envoy “did not even 
know where the party committee was for all the time of his stay in Nezhin” 
[ЦДАГОУ. Ф. 1. Оп. 18. Д. 16. Л. 93]. In other words, the choice was either 
to use activists with local connections who risked being arrested or outsid-
ers who would be safer but unable to act. In Odessa, “it [was] decided in 
advance that all communists who were not under physical threat, that is 
those who would not be prosecuted, [would be] strongly recommended to 
stay” which meant especially that “women [were] strongly recommended 
to stay” [КП(б)У за денікінщини, 1930, № 1, с. 230]. Although they seem 
to have been a minority among the underground activists 3, the participa-
tion of women is indeed noteworthy, as they accomplished missions just as 
risky as those of their male counterparts.
Other subaltern categories were also especially committed to undermin-
ing Denikin’s victory. Dedicated party organizations like the Young Com-
munists’ League and the head committee of the Jewish Communist Union 
encouraged them to do so. The latter provided the CC of the CP(b)U with 
the names of 13 volunteers from among its senior activists. [ЦДАГОУ. Ф. 
1. Оп. 18. Д. 5, Л. 29, 33]. When we note in another document that one 
Jewish activist’s monicker was Spinoza, one can imagine the ideals that moti-
3 For instance, among the 49 names authoring reports, there are four feminine ones 
[ЦДАГОУ. Ф. 1. Оп. 18. Д. 16]. Still, it is difficult to be sure of the gender of the activists. 
Statistical records mention the number of envoys per region and city, but do not say a word 
about people’s profiles. In their turn, the reports relate about missions and how they were 
completed and give only scarce information about the activists themselves. One might guess 
the agent’s gender whenever it is mentioned as being relevant to the fact or by his/her name, 
although monikers can be misleading.
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vated them to risk their lives [ЦДАГОУ. Ф. 1. Оп. 18. Д. 16. Л. 17]. Howev-
er, the dedication of Jews and youngsters eventually proved to be a problem 
for underground organizers. As one stated, central party bodies “left [behind 
enemy lines] thousands of little boys and girls who did not at all suit the 
job and impeded it… they mainly left Jew[ish] com[rades], who are just not 
suitable for Ukraine in this atmosphere of pogroms. <…> Jews are thrown 
out of railway coaches or just killed” [ЦДАГОУ. Ф. 1. Оп. 18. Д. 5. Л. 11в; 
КП(б)У за Денікінщини, с. 281]. The peak of anti–Semitic atrocities was in-
deed reached in Ukraine in the summer of 1919 [Abramson, p. 114]. On the 
one hand, anti-Semitism was strong among peasants who feared that “behind 
Soviet power Jews will stand” [ЦДАГОУ. Ф. 1. Оп. 18. Д. 20. Л. 8–9 об.]. On 
the other, the Whites treated their Red prisoners along political, national, and 
racial criteria: “Communists are shot on the spot. Commanders are beaten or 
killed. The same goes for Jews, Latvians, and Chinese. <…> First of all, the 
Cossacks demanded ‘Yid nurses’ be handed over” [ЦДАГОУ. Ф. 1. Оп. 18. 
Д. 5. Л. 16]. As a consequence, one organizer bluntly expressed “the urgent 
need for Russian (only Russian) activists” to be sent.
In fact, they had to be satisfied with the people on hand, be they “deserters 
who did not want to follow the Red Army’s retreat and who remained as par-
asites” or “devoted and honest revolutionaries” [КП(б)У за Денікінщини, 
1929, с. 295]. Besides moral qualities, skills and efficiency could be victims to 
the loose recruitment structure. An agent shot another comrade by accident 
during a secret meeting in Yekaterinoslav, perhaps because they were not used 
to weapons [Там же, с. 290]. Amateurism could have less tragic and even 
funny consequences. In late summer 1919, a group of activists from Bakhmut 
had the wonderful idea of setting up a peculiar form of underground activity: 
four of them joined a Ukrainian touring theatre company in order to cross 
the frontline and then travel freely in the White territory. Eventually, after 
various setbacks (including learning how to act), their plan failed and they 
had to wait for the Red Army’s decisive offensive in December to go back to 
Ukraine [ЦДАГОУ. Ф. 1. Оп. 18. Д. 20. Л. 14–15]. Among the mishaps that 
delayed them was also the tardiness of some party structures when it came to 
helping volunteers, which was sharply criticized by other activists as early as 
July [ЦДАГОУ. Ф. 1. Оп. 18. Д. 47. Л. 1].
The Organization of Underground Missions
The impression of negligence is confirmed when considering the organi-
zation of missions: “The CC did not have a defined point of view concerning 
the underground work under Denikin. <…> They gave certain instructions 
to some envoys and different ones to other envoys, and for us, remaining in 
the deep rear… it was difficult to choose an option” [ЦДАГОУ. Ф 1. Оп. 18. 
Д. 16. Л. 18–19; КП(б)У и Деникинщина, с. 33–34]. Furthermore, “there 
was no general plan in order to build underground organizations” and 
“throughout the four months of reaction, all in all only two directives [were 
sent] from the center, and only very recently” [КП(б)У за Денікінщини, 
1929, с. 303, 307].
É. Aunoble                      Ukrainian Communists under General Denikin 97
Apart from technical and political matters, which will be dealt with 
later, disorganization appears to have been the result of poor coordina-
tion among the many different organizations tackling the issue: “The sev-
eral different existing Zafrontbyuros and committees to transfer people do 
not do anything good” [КП(б)У за Денікінщини, 1929, с. 304]. If we try 
to list the different bodies dealing with underground activists behind en-
emy lines, we find that the Central Committee of the CP(b)U alone estab-
lished the organization bureau (orgbyuro), the Zafrontbyuro, the military 
department (Voenotdel), and the latter’s communications department 
(Otdel svyazi). The Voenotdel, which was specialized in setting up insur-
gent units, and the Zafrontbyuro were supposed to work together under 
the supervision of the Orgbyuro [ЦДАГОУ. Ф. 1. Оп. 18. Д. 40. Л. 11]. 
The Otdel svyazi was meant to keep in touch with the HQs of insurgent 
units in order to share political information and guidance, as well as pro-
vide material support [Там же. Л. 16]. Alongside the inner bodies of the 
CP(b)U’s CC, military intelligence (Registrup RVSR) was also interest-
ed in collecting information about White–occupied territories; however, 
it was not connected with the CP(b)U, but rather with the foreign bureaus 
of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) [ЦДАГОУ. Ф. 1. Оп. 18. 
Д. 5. Л. 25]. This reminds us of the special status of the CP(b)U as both 
a self-standing party and a branch of the RCP(b). This means that 
a communist from Ukraine could switch from an organ of the CP(b)U to 
a Ukrainian body of the RCP(b) if the former’s policy did not please him 
[ЦДАГОУ. Ф. 1. Оп. 18. Д. 16. Л. 59 об.]. Moreover, as the frontline 
moved westward in late 1919, party structures, whatever they were, had 
to coordinate with the Red Army [ЦДАГОУ. Ф. 1. Оп. 18. Д. 5. Л. 26; 
КП(б)У за Денікінщини, 1929, с. 273–274].
What can be described as chaos in the decision-making is also typi-
cal of what Marc Ferro has called the “polymorphous power” and “insti-
tutional polymorphism” that left an imprint on the Soviet state from its 
revolutionary origins [Ferro]. And one must not forget that this was an ad-
aptation to real difficulties. As the frontline moved throughout the second 
half of 1919, so too did the Zafrontbyuro, from Kiev to Kremenchug, Bry-
ansk, Moscow and eventually Serpukhov [Мишкис, с. 248–249; КП(б)У 
за Денікінщини, 1929, с. 269]. Activists at its disposal were sought to en-
ter local party cells before being sent behind enemy lines: this added to 
the institutional complexity and made untimely individual initiatives pos-
sible [ЦДАГОУ. Ф. 1. Оп. 18. Д. 16. Л. 57 об.; Ф. 1. Оп. 18. Д. 20. Л. 14; 
КП(б)У за Денікінщини, 1929, с. 267].
All this was a consequence of the specific type of war going on. Andrei 
Bubnov, a high-ranking Ukrainian Bolshevik, was aware of this: “under 
today’s circumstances, work behind the frontline […must] combine the 
methods of ‘great’ and ‘little’ wars” [ЦДАГОУ. Ф. 1. Оп. 18. Д. 42. Л. 58]. 
Thus, three types of missions were envisaged for Bolsheviks sent behind 
enemy lines. First, intelligence missions would gather information of a mil-
itary and, above all, political character through envoy observations and col-
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lected White newspapers 4. Second, organizational missions would aim at 
connecting with existing underground Bolshevik groups or setting up and 
strengthening such groups. Third, military missions would create and coor-
dinate partisan units. There were two categories of envoys, “senior officials” 
(700 otvetstvennye rabotniki) with political responsibilities and “technical 
workers” (100 tekhnicheskie rabotniki, mainly printers or military special-
ists) [ЦДАГОУ. Ф. 1. Оп. 18. Д. 5, Л. 43–45; Мишкис, с. 250].
The different bodies that organized the missions prepared lists and tables 
in order to manage the envoys, but their main logistical task was to provide 
them with money, mandates, false documents, and the addresses of yavki 
(hideouts). Money was needed to fund underground activity, but it made the 
envoys vulnerable to theft and ransom [ЦДАГОУ. Ф. 1. Оп. 18. Д. 5. Л. 51a, 
51б; Ф. 1. Оп. 18. Д. 16. Л. 42]. Mandates, which had to be hidden until be-
ing exhibited as credentials to local comrades, were usually printed on fabric 
and sewn into the linings of garments. False documents were also a sensi-
tive issue, as envoys relied on them when they were checked by the Strazha. 
Unfortunately, these were weak spots in the Central Committee’s technical 
organization: “three-foot-long mandates” were not suitable for secrecy, and 
“more than one comrade was shot because of ‘little inaccuracies’ in passports”, 
such as a non–existent address or an implausible date of issue [ЦДАГОУ. 
Ф. 1. Оп. 18. Д. 16. Л. 19; КП(б)У и Деникинщина, с. 34].
Many of these complaints are known thanks to envoys’ reports. Before 
the reconquest of Ukraine, these reports were the minutes of formal debrief-
4 A man caught by Denikin’s police, the Strazha, with a collection of newspapers would 
be suspected of being a Bolshevik; and if caught by the Reds, they would consider him 
a white agent [КП(б)У за Денікінщини, 1929, с. 268–269; ЦДАГОУ. Ф. 1. Оп. 18. Д. 16. Л. 31].
3. А yavka (safe house) in Kharkov and its password // TsDAGOU. Stock 1. List 18.  
Dos. 41. F. 18
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ings held upon the envoy’s return: a secretary wrote down the contents of the 
interview and the envoy signed. Those who were still in Ukraine when the 
Red Army came wrote their reports after the victory. Both these sources offer 
a very colorful picture of the missions completed by the activists.
Underground Missions under Denikin
Activists faced a very ambitious agenda, but most of them succeeded re-
gardless of the difficulties. Among the reports of intelligence and organiza-
tional missions we examined for this study, a quarter failed 5. Some activists 
were not able to pass through the frontline. Others were arrested as soon as 
they arrived in the White territory or became seriously ill with influenza or 
typhus. In some cases, envoys could not make contact with anyone during 
their time behind enemy lines [ЦДАГОУ. Ф. 1. Оп. 18. Д. 16. 20, 21, 42]. 
In any case, three-quarters of the reports tell how activists succeeded and 
embarked on what looked like very adventurous journeys. For instance, one 
traveled from Kiev to Krivoy Rog (Kryvyi Rih), Yekaterinoslav, Khar’kov, 
Kiev, Glukhov (Hlukhiv) and Briansk (1 800 km), while another left from 
Gomel to Poltava, Yuzovka (Donetsk), Armavir, Rostov, Lozovaya, Khar-
kov, Kursk and L’gov (2 600 km), all in enemy territory except for the cit-
ies of departure and arrival. As undercover agents, they had to play roles: 
a railway mechanic or, more ironically, a bagger (meshochnik) or speculator 
(considered the most secure) [ЦДАГОУ. Ф. 1. Оп. 18. Д. 16. Л. 64, 68, 73].
The main risk was being arrested, and the reports give an interesting 
insight into a much-discussed topic, the counter-revolutionary repression 
under Denikin. The first difficult step was to cross the frontline, where one 
could be shot if one’s papers were proven false or if one was caught by chance 
[ЦДАГОУ. Ф. 1. Оп. 18. Д. 21. Л. 1; Ф. 1. Оп. 18. Д. 42. Л. 4]. Nevertheless, 
the frontline was not an insurmountable barrier: the most dangerous plac-
es for underground Bolsheviks were trains and railway stations, especially 
due to the aforementioned persecution of “Jewish-looking” activists. This 
sounds quite logical for various reasons. To the astonishment of under-
ground Bolsheviks, Denikin did not leave that many soldiers or policemen 
in the rear [ЦДАГОУ. Ф. 1. Оп. 18. Д. 5. Л. 2–5, 11; Ф. 1. Оп. 18. Д. 16. 
Л. 18–19]. Coaches and railway premises were much easier places to con-
trol and lockdown. Furthermore, all dubious people, thieves, smugglers, 
and revolutionaries alike, would be more likely to travel than the average 
obyvatel' (man on the street). When the latter went by train, they would 
be eager to report suspicious people to the railway guard, as they feared 
for their own life and security. As all society was under the stress of civil 
war, mutual fear and antagonism contributed to a pogrom-like atmosphere 
where people resorted to violence against “Jewish – looking” individuals 
as an outlet. Last but not least, railway guards arrested people randomly 
in order to ask them for bribes.
5 As dead people do not write accounts, reports of failures do not include the shooting 
of envoys.
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Once in operation, an underground activist could also be arrested when 
the enemy carried out roundups, especially after a place had been con-
quered [КП(б)У за Денікінщини, 1929, с. 292]. Even the Makhnovists did 
so against communists [ЦДАГОУ. Ф. 1. Оп. 18. Д. 16. Л. 40]. Of course, the 
most dangerous moment was when taking action, be it leafleting or trying 
to steal money for the cause [КП(б)У за Денікінщини, 1929, с. 297–298]. 
Equally, Bolsheviks could also be arrested as soon as they were recog-
nized as such on the street. This could happen by chance [ЦДАГОУ. Ф. 1. 
Оп. 18. Д. 16. Л. 47] 6, but underground activists were particularly vulnera-
ble to provocateurs. The latter were mainly former supporters of the Soviet 
regime who had changed sides (including Red Army officers and Cheka of-
ficials) [КП(б)У за Денікінщини, 1929, с. 295, 301; ЦДАГОУ. Ф. 1. Оп. 18. 
Д. 16. Л. 16–16 об., 63, 97 об.]. Communists tried to counteract this by 
setting up locally some counter-counter–intelligence service through their 
underground organizations [КП(б)У за Денікінщини, 1929, с. 289]. Later, 
after the Red victory, identified provocateurs were listed, seemingly to 
be searched and prosecuted [ЦДАГОУ. Ф. 1. Оп. 18. Д. 5. Л. 48].
Once arrested, a communist risked being beaten up and being shot on 
the spot. One activist recalled: “I saw how those who had arrested my com-
rade led him across the railway line, from where one shot of a revolver was 
heard. I do not know about his further fate” [ЦДАГОУ. Ф. 1. Оп. 18. Д. 16. 
Л. 65]. If not executed right away, a Bolshevik could be confronted with quite 
varied situations after having been arrested. One saved his life by pretending 
he was a criminal and not a revolutionary [КП(б)У за Денікінщини, 1929, 
с. 297]. When identified as a communist, one could be “beastly tortured” in 
order to make one confess and give away one’s comrades. Nonetheless, there 
was a fairly simple and reliable means to save jailed comrades: to buy their 
lives and freedom by giving bribes to Denikin’s policemen or prison war-
dens. This could be done by the inmate himself if he had enough money. It 
could also be negotiated by a dedicated branch of the underground Bolshevik 
organization in town, the “Political Red Cross” [КП(б)У за Денікінщини, 
1929, с. 285–286, 296; 1930, № 1, с. 238]. Hence, arrested Reds were con-
sidered “money bags” [ЦДАГОУ. Ф. 1. Оп. 18. Д. 42. Л. 46]: the price for 
freedom ranged from 2 000 to 40 000 rubles according to different sources. 
Thus, underground Bolshevik groups faced financial pressure: “Due to the 
lack of financial resources… comrades surely died; with money, we could 
have bought them back” [КП(б)У за Денікінщини, 1929, с. 297].
The possibility of buying back arrested revolutionaries shows just how 
loose discipline and moral standards were among the White security forces. 
It also suggests paradoxically that Bolshevik activists had some individual 
value that was recognized by their enemies, albeit in a monetary way. This 
contrasts sharply with other forms of “White Terror”, which was perpetrat-
6 Or due to mishaps of the Reds: Denikin’s intelligence found lists of Soviet officials, 
which were published in the press: and arrests were ordered on this basis [КП(б)У 
за Денікінщини, 1929, с. 302].
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ed en masse against Red Army prisoners, petty collaborators of the defeated 
Soviet regime or rioting villagers 7. The sense of one’s worth can also be felt 
in the envoys’ reports when they recall their adventurous deeds and heroic 
gestures. One envoy who was about to be searched shot the enemy agent 
with the latter’s own Browning [ЦДАГОУ. Ф. 1. Оп. 18. Д. 20. Л. 6 об.]. 
Another, who was imprisoned, managed to save a fellow inmate’s life by 
arguing that she was a very young girl and the daughter of a priest 8. He was 
then beaten with sabers and bayonets and left for dead… allowing him to 
escape [ЦДАГОУ. Ф. 1. Оп. 18. Д. 16. Л. 93–93 об.]. When reading these 
accounts, one might think that such bravado better fits a spy or war novel 
than a narrative of class struggle.
From Disillusionment to Policy Shift
The social and political situation in Ukraine after the Red Army’s retreat 
had an impact on the Bolsheviks’ views and practices, as we can read in the 
intelligence reports written by the Party’s envoys. As they considered them-
selves activists of “the party of the proletariat”, we will concentrate mainly 
on the accounts they wrote about the most industrialized places, eastern 
Ukraine and the Donbass 9, to see how their Marxist patterns of analysis 
could fit reality.
The envoys wrote captivating pieces of literature, not only when they re-
late their risky adventures, but also when they describe everyday life in White 
territory, as if they were explorers in some wild land or, more properly, time 
travelers in the pre–revolutionary past. Just after he had crossed the frontline, 
one first noticed “constables (zhandarmy) dressed as under the tsar”. Then, 
peasants told him about the return of their landlords, backed by Cossacks. 
Further into the Donbass, he met “starved and ragged workers forced out 
of their houses to go to work by a bailiff (pristav) with a whip (nagayka) in 
his hands”. This picture of brutal exploitation in the Donbass is confirmed 
by other Bolshevik envoys describing the “heavy situation (shooting, arrests, 
insufficient wages) ” and workers trying to flee the region [ЦДАГОУ. Ф. 1. 
Оп. 18. Д. 20. Л. 2–2 об., 6; see also: Куромія, с. 158–159].
However, reports also describe some more disturbing facts for the Bol-
shevik doxa. Envoys agree in stating that markets were flourishing again af-
ter the Reds had gone: food products reappeared and prices fell [ЦДАГОУ. 
Ф. 1. Оп. 18. Д. 16. Л. 32 об., 38–39]. Although the drop in wages was 
7 About the ill treatment of Red Army prisoners, see [ЦДАГОУ. Ф. 1. Оп. 18. Д. 20. 
Л. 4; КП(б)У и Деникинщина, с. 29]. Concerning the Judicial Inquiry Commissions against 
“participants of the Bolshevik sedition”, see: [ЦДАГОУ. Ф. 998. Оп. 1. Д. 1; Полтавская 
судебно-следовательная комиссия начальника гарнизона Добровольческой армии, 
1919; Ф. 1012, Оп. 1. Д. 1, 2, 3, 4, 6. Харьковская судебно-следовательная комиссия, 
1919]. About “punitive units” (karatel’nye otrjady) in the countryside, see reports by 
Bolshevik envoys: [ЦДАГОУ. Ф. 1. Оп. 18. Д. 16. Л. 34, 55 об.; Д. 20. Л. 2; Д. 33. Л. 3, 5]. For 
a discussion about White Terror, see: [Bortnevski; Цветков].
8 She was Jewish.
9 Including its Russian part around Rostov.
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cruelly felt, abundance had an impact on the workers’ mood. Interviewed 
refugees from Kharkov who fled to the Reds reported that “great discontent 
against Denikin cannot be observed” and the local newspaper published 
“workers’ resolutions backing Denikin” [ЦДАГОУ. Ф. 1. Оп. 18. Д. 5, Л. 9, 
15]. Even though socialist parties were forbidden, trade unions still exist-
ed and gave shelter to leftist activists. Mensheviks headed them and dared 
to oppose the Whites’ power by organizing (or being allowed to organize) 
strikes, although on a purely economic basis. [ЦДАГОУ. Ф. 1. Оп. 18. Д. 5. 
Л. 3, 6, 7; Ф. 1. Оп. 18. Д. 16. Л. 15, 32 об., 68; КП(б)У и Деникинщина, 
с. 29; КП(б)У за Денікінщини, 1929, с. 302, 311].
Menshevik leaders avoided raising the flag of revolution and respected the 
existing laws. In turn, “Denikin could play with urban democracy” 10 [КП(б)У 
за Денікінщини, 1929, с. 310]. Menshevik leadership in the labor movement 
was not only based on the fact that they were less persecuted than the Bolshe-
viks. Envoys had to admit that this moderate policy suited the workers better. 
Reading some reports, communists might even think that Menshevism was 
a lesser evil in the political evolution of the Ukrainian working class. Railway 
workers were said to be on the Whites’ side [ЦДАГОУ. Ф. 1. Оп. 18. Д. 16. 
Л. 32], which might have been the consequence of the conflict that sparked 
between the Bolsheviks and the Vikzhel, the railway workers’ union, as early 
as October 1917 [see: Augustine; Rosenberg].
However, the workers’ hostility toward Bolsheviks existed beyond 
the proletarian aristocracy of railway workers. The account of Afonin, 
a skilled worker and a revolutionary since 1905, is of particular interest. 
In 1917, he was working at the Gartman factory in Lugansk (Luhansk), 
a heavy steam-engine factory employing 5,000 workers. He was the sec-
retary of a Bolshevik organization, was elected to the local soviet, and 
worked closely with Voroshilov. In early 1918, the factory was a Bolshe-
vik stronghold, providing Red guards to fight against the Germans. Thus, 
Afonin became a Red soldier and fought at Tsaritsyn later that same 
year [Гражданская война, с. 140–141; Великий Жовтень, с. 45, 132]. 
He was in Kiev when the city fell into the hands of Denikin’s troops 
in August 1919. After 150 Kievian Bolsheviks were arrested and shot, 
he headed to the Donbass and managed to get hired back at the Gartman 
factory. He proposed setting up a Bolshevik group to two colleagues: 
“They refused to work for the party cell, invoking the workers’ anti-So-
viet counter-revolutionary mood, which I had noticed; I saw how some 
comrades had been grabbed from their workbenches by White police-
men and how some workers were pleased about it. <…> Red Lugansk 
was red until conscious comrades retreated, but, under Denikin, Lu-
gansk was bright white” [ЦДАГОУ. Ф. 1. Оп. 18. Д. 20. Л. 10].
Being uprooted from the toiling masses, Bolshevik underground groups 
could not rely on a web of sympathizers and were more vulnerable to re-
10 “Democracy” is used in the meaning coined in February 1917, as a synonym for 
socialist parties.
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pression. This explains the successive provaly (collapses) of illegal party 
and revolutionary committees in various cities. Organizational failures and 
the inability to influence the working class provoked bitter discussions and 
political reassessments in the underground. In Khar’kov, some recently 
dispatched activists stuck to the old party line, highlighting the need to 
strengthen party groups first, whereas locals stated that “along with organi-
zational work, the military department must be instructed to help disorga-
nize the enemy’s rear by all means necessary” [КП(б)У и Деникинщина, 
с. 26]. This course toward the organization of sabotage and insurgent groups 
could not be implemented in Khar’kov, where most party committee mem-
bers were soon arrested. However, in Lugansk after the failure of factory 
militancy, “people were sent to nearby environs… and it was soon possible 
to organize 18 villages and four mining communities, aiming at setting up 
groups of fighters rather than of party members” [ЦДАГОУ. Ф. 1. Оп. 18. 
Д. 16. Л. 16 об.]. Lugansk insurgents succeeded, for instance, in sabotaging 
the railway [ЦДАГОУ. Ф. 1. Оп. 18. Д. 20. Л. 12 об.]. Similarly, the party 
cell in Potok, a suburb of Kremenchug, decided to hinder the Whites’ war 
effort “by means of terror”, “despite the fact that a partisan group is con-
trary to the program of the party, but taking into account today’s situation”. 
Nonetheless, they would at least “try to form a purely communist group” 
[ЦДАГОУ. Ф. 1. Оп. 18. Д. 5. Л. 79–80].
In fact, although they thought they were straying from the Party’s pro-
gram, the Bolsheviks from Potok were sticking to the Party line, or at least 
to the line of some party bodies. Since the summer, the military department 
of the CP(b)U had been enforcing the establishment of partisan units in 
Denikin’s rear. This was no easy task. The war-like reaction of the White 
forces was even more bloody than the repression in towns. Peasants were 
defiant towards commissars, Jews, and “the commune” and were thus more 
inclined to follow Petlyurists or Makhnovists than communists [ЦДАГОУ. 
Ф. 1. Оп. 18. Д. 5. Л. 20a–20б. Д. 16. Л. 13 об. Д. 20. Л. 8–9 об. Д. 42. 
Л. 5–6]. Still, the reports about Bolshevik leadership in peasant partisan 
units are impressive. Envoys with no local connections could become the 
commanders of spontaneous groups made up of left nationalists (borot’by-
sty) or socialists, even if they arrived straight from Moscow [ЦДАГОУ. 
Ф. 1. Оп. 18. Д. 42. Л. 7, 53, 62]. This means that whereas the urban working 
class was apathetic in the second half of 1919, the Ukrainian peasantry was 
rising once again, looking for cadres able to guide the insurgency. The Bol-
sheviks proved to have both the organizational and political skills for this.
*   *   *
The Zafrontbyuro and the communications department of the CP(b)U’s 
CC called the activists sent behind enemy lines “agents”, a term that ac-
tivists themselves used [КП(б)У за Денікінщини, с. 264; ЦДАГОУ. Ф. 1. 
Оп. 18. Д. 16. Л. 62 об.; Ф. 1. Оп. 18. Д. 42. Л. 16–17]. It was an accurate 
word, as the activists were mostly involved in spying and setting up irreg-
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ular armed units. By doing so, they contributed to ousting Denikin from 
Ukraine. However, this was a sharp shift from their original class-oriented 
militancy. The CP and Red Army apparatuses exercised objective pressure 
in this direction. Subjectively, political reality proved to be different from 
their Marxist blueprint: “We are welcomed by peasants whereas workers 
are indifferent” [КП(б)У за Денікінщини, 1929, с. 310].
This forced the Bolsheviks to adapt not only their political practices 
but also their worldview, which had long-lasting consequences, beginning 
with the last days of 1919. Henceforth, the CP(b)U’s course sharply differed 
from that a year earlier. First, a new personnel policy was implemented by 
instruction of the RCP(b) in order to prevent “the inundation of Soviet in-
stitutions with elements of the Ukrainian urban petty bourgeoisie, devoid 
of understanding of the living conditions of the broad peasant masses and 
often cloaking themselves with the banner of communism”. In plain words, 
this meant cutting off the flux of Jewish communists [Pavliuchenkov, p. 34]. 
Meanwhile, the radical and equalitarian agrarian policy of early 1919 was 
dropped in favor of “striving for reconciliation with the middle peasant-
ry” [Раковский, с. 19; see: Aunoble, 2008, p. 178–184]. In turn, this peas-
ant-friendly orientation also strengthened the Ukrainian national-commu-
nist current. An envoy in western Ukraine reported in late 1919 about the 
positive reception of Bolshevism in nationalist milieus [ЦДАГОУ. Ф.  1. 
Оп. 18. Д. 16. Л. 3–9 об., 50–50 об.; the report was published at the peak 
of the Ukrainisation policy: Попов, с. 43–50].
On the complex stage of Ukrainian society, the Bolsheviks now played 
a quite new role. “Proletarian revolutionaries” led armed peasants (as par-
tisans or Red soldiers) to penetrate Ukrainian industrial cities just like con-
querors invading foreign soil [Кульчицкий, т.  1, с.  414–415]. Although 
Ukrainian peasant support for the Reds would not outlast the winter 
of 1919–1920, the Bolsheviks’ mistrust towards the mass of workers also 
became permanent. In December 1919, Zatonsky declared that Donbass 
miners’ “proletarian consciousness, which was already low, is now com-
pletely crushed” [Quoted by Куромія, с.  172–173]. A Khar’kov activist 
would later remember that “at the first party meeting [after the liberation 
of the city], there were 300 people claiming to be communists and con-
sidering that hiding and not doing anything had been a great help for us” 
under Denikin [ДАХО. Ф. П10. Оп. 1. Д. 344. Л. 34]. Thus, the communist 
activists worked and lived more and more amongst themselves, just like 
the aristocracy they thought they were [Aunoble, 2015, p. 243–245].
Closed to the surrounding population, the communist elite was none-
theless far from united. The defiance of field activists toward the Party’s ap-
paratus, which sent them with improper credentials, and the way some ig-
nored the leadership’s directives was not forgotten in the Communist Party 
of Ukraine, which was always bitterly divided into competing factions. The 
publication of archival material recalling some people’s failures easily became 
a weapon in internal squabbles, as footnotes explained that such and such 
had become oppositionists [КП(б)У за Денікінщини, 1929, с. 322–323].
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Last but not least, peasant guerrilla warfare became a tool in the commu-
nist toolbox. The experience of Siberian [see: Pereira] and Ukrainian parti-
sans was taught in the Soviet Union [Дробов, с. 110–160]. In 1936, the Ko-
mintern senior activist Walter (Tito) probably attended “courses in guerrilla 
warfare and espionage organized by the Cadres Department at the so-called 
‘Partisan Academy’ in Riazan in reaction to the Spanish Civil War” [Pirjevec, 
p. 26]. During World War Two, Soviet and Yugoslavian communists would 
make partisan warfare a distinctive trait of communist struggle, and Chi-
nese communists would soon control the most populous country on Earth 
by these means. Ukraine in 1919 was one of the first laboratories where this 
move from labor militancy to peasant insurgency was experimented with.
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